Environmental federalism : a panacea or Pandora's box for developing countries? by Fredriksson, Per G. et al.
 
Environmental Federalism: A Panacea or Pandora’s 






University of Louisville 
 
Muthukumara Mani 
The World Bank 
 
Jim R. Wollscheid 




This paper provides new empirical evidence to the debate on the optimal locus of power over 
environmental policymaking in developing countries. We develop a simple lobby group model with 
mobile capital. The model predicts that a decentralized institutional structure leads to weaker 
environmental policy due to more intensive lobbying by capital owners and workers. We test this 
prediction using novel cross-sectional developing country data. The results are consistent with the 
prediction of the model, in particular for air pollution policies. Moreover, we also find that the effect of 
decentralization declines with a greater degree of trade openness. We believe this is the first developing 
country evidence on the environmental policy effects of federalism. 
Keywords: Federalism, Capital Competition, Lobbying, Political Economy, Environmental Policy. 
JEL Codes: Q28, F21, R38, D72, D78 
 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3847, February 2006 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the 
exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the 
presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited 
accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. 
They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they 
represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
 
Corresponding author: Muthukumara Mani (mmani@worldbank.org) 
 
* We thank Richard Damania, Kirk Hamilton, Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay and Angeliki Kourelis for 



















































































































I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The choice of the optimal locus of power over environmental policies continues to attract 
attention in academic and public policy debates. Should environmental policymaking be 
centralized or decentralized? The theoretical literature has so far failed to converge on a 
consensus recommendation regarding the optimal government level of environmental 
policymaking. Some argue that a race-to-the-bottom in environmental policies will result from 
decentralized environmental policymaking, while others suggest a race-to-the-top.1 Others argue 
that decentralized and centralized systems lead to equivalent policy outcomes.2 Neither has a 
clear empirical prediction emerged.3 Moreover, the literature has ignored the empirical outcomes 
under different regulatory designs in developing countries.4 In this paper, we ask: do developing 
countries with decentralized systems set environmental policies with different degree of 
stringency than centralized lower-income countries? We believe that this paper may both fill a 
gap in the literature, and help underpin the policy debate in developing countries. 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Oates and Schwab (1988), Rauscher (1994), Levinson (1997), Markusen et al. (1993, 1995), Glazer 
(1999), Ulph (2000), McAusland (2002), and Kunce and Shogren (2002, 2005) for theoretical models yielding such 
different predictions due to, e.g., the presence of capital competition and transboundary pollution.   
2 See Fredriksson and Gaston (2000). 
3 The existing empirical evidence comes mainly from the U.S. E.g., List and Gerking (2000) report that state level 
pollution levels did not deteriorate as a result of President Reagan decentralizing environmental policymaking, and 
Millimet (2003) finds no impact on abatement costs of this event. Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) find evidence of 
strategic interaction in environmental policymaking among U.S. states, Fredriksson et al. (2004) suggest that this 
interaction may encompass several policy instruments (also non-environmental), while Sigman (2005) find free 
riding behavior by U.S. states’ implementation of the Clean Water Act. Oates (2001) reports that U.S. states have 
introduced environmental regulations that go beyond federal requirements. Additional evidence includes Murdoch 
and Sandler (1997) and Murdoch et al. (1997) who find evidence of free-riding in European countries’ control of 
pollution emissions, Sigman (2002) who argues that countries free-ride in their river pollution clean-up efforts, and 
Eliste and Fredriksson (2004) who find some evidence indicating cross-country strategic interactions in 
environmental policies. 
4 International financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF view decentralization as one of the most 
important governance and institutional reform initiatives, with a view to reform the inefficient public sector, 
increase competition among sub-national governments in efficient delivery of public services, and escape from low 
rates of  economic growth (World Bank 1999, 2002). While there is no formalized theory of such a relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth, it is believed that policies formulated for the provision of 
infrastructure and education that are sensitive to regional or local conditions are likely to be more effective in   2
  To guide our empirical work, we start by deriving a theoretical prediction of the 
difference in environmental policy outcomes under two alternative institutional designs: 
centralized and decentralized government policymaking. We model a federation with two 
jurisdictions, where capital is mobile between jurisdictions (but immobile internationally). Our 
lobby group model builds on the common agency approach pioneered by Grossman and 
Helpman (1994, 1995). Worker, capital owner, and environmental lobby groups seek to 
influence environmental policy by offering the government (i.e., either the central or local 
government) prospective political gifts in return for a more favorable environmental policy. The 
government cares about social welfare, in addition to political contributions. The prediction that 
emerges is that environmental policy is weaker in decentralized systems. This is due to greater 
political pressure from the capital owners and workers under the decentralized regulatory design, 
induced by capital competition. 
We test this prediction using unique cross-sectional developing country data on 
environmental policy from the World Bank (2004). This appears to be a novel approach in this 
literature. In our sample of 90 developing countries, we find that federations - with decentralized 
environmental policymaking - tend to set weaker environmental policies than centralized 
countries.5 This is especially the case for policies addressing air pollution. Moreover, we also 
                                                                                                                                                             
encouraging economic development than centrally determined policies that ignore geographical differences (Oates, 
1993). 
5 For example, in India, Mexico and Nigeria decentralization is based on the political/legal structures as outlined in 
the constitution, specific laws, or government bills. The states or provinces have their own elected government with 
a wide range of fiscal powers and enforcement responsibilities, including in the environmental policy area (World 
Bank, 1999; Bhatt and Majeed, 2002). In contrast, countries such as Viet Nam, Bolivia, and Ghana are unitary 
states, where environmental enforcement is regulated through decrees or directives from the central government 
(World Bank, 1999).    3
find that the effect of federalism is conditional on the degree of openness to trade.6 In particular, 
our findings suggest that the effect of decentralization is smaller in more open countries. We 
believe this is the first evidence of this nature in the literature.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the theoretical model and result. 
Section III discusses the empirical approach, while Section IV reports the empirical results. 
Section V provides a brief conclusion.  
II. MODEL 
Consider an economy with two jurisdictions, in each of which a large number of 
individuals live and work. We will denote the two jurisdictions by One and Two, respectively, 
where we use a “
*” to denote the latter. We aim to study two different regulatory designs for 
these jurisdictions: (i) decentralized policy making, and (ii) centralized policy making. In the 
case of decentralized environmental governance, a local authority sets the standard for 
environmental quality; more specifically, it determines the aggregate allowed waste emissions 
for its own jurisdiction only. With a centralized system, a federal regulator sets a uniform 
emissions limit across the two jurisdictions.  
Each jurisdiction contains firms that produce a private good, Q, for a perfectly 
competitive international market.  Production requires inputs of capital (K) and labor (L), and 
polluting waste emissions (θ); the latter is treated as a non-purchased input.  There is no 
spillover of pollution across jurisdictions.  The production technology exhibits constant returns 
to scale, is concave and increasing in all inputs, and twice continuously-
differentiable:QF K L = (,,) θ , which by linear homogeneity may be rewritten as QL f k = (,) α , 
                                                 
6  Our theory maintains an assumption of free trade. In our empirical work, we test the importance of this 
assumption by investigating whether the institutions of federalism has a different effect in relatively open countries. 
Government policy making may already has reacted to increased exposure to foreign trade.    4
where  K/L k =  is the capital-labor ratio and  θ/L α =  is the emissions-labor ratio.  Suppressing 
arguments and using subscripts to denote partial derivatives, the marginal products of capital, 
emissions, and labor are given by  k f ,  α f , and  ) ( α k αf kf f − − , respectively.  The marginal 
products are diminishing, i.e.,  0 < kk f , 0 < αα f , and we assume that  0 > kα f , i.e., increases in α 
raise the marginal product of capital.   
While labor is assumed immobile, the capital stock is perfectly mobile between the two 
jurisdictions, but immobile internationally.7 The rate of return on capital is equalized across both 
jurisdictions, whether a decentralized or centralized regime is in place.  Formally, the common 
rate of return, r, must satisfy  ). , ( ) , (
* * * α α k f k f r k k = =   While a local policy-maker is concerned 
with the impact of more stringent local environmental standards on capital flows from their 
jurisdiction, a national policy-maker need not be concerned with capital flight.  We assume that 
the economy has an aggregate capital stock equal to  . K  
We assume that there are three types of individuals in each jurisdiction: workers, 
environmentalists, and capital owners.  Normalizing the population in each jurisdiction (or in the 
economy, when appropriate) to unity, let  , , β β
E W  and 
K β  represent the proportion of the 
population that are workers, environmentalists, and capital owners, respectively. The 
environmentalists’ aggregate income, Y
E , is exogenously determined. Workers supply one unit 
of labor and are paid a wage equal to the sum of the marginal product of labor plus the additional 
output arising from the increase in allowable pollution emissions, 
α αf , hence, wage income 
equals  wfk f k =− . All individuals gain utility from consuming the polluting good, but 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
7 A high degree of international capital immobility is a well-established empirical regularity, see for example 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Gordon and Bovenberg (1996).     5
environmentalists also suffer disutility from the pollution associated with local production.   
Individuals are assumed to have additively-separable utility functions  θ λ
E i i c U − = , where 
W,E, i =  and K index workers, environmentalists, and capital owners, respectively, and  1 =
E λ  
for environmentalists (0, otherwise). 
Centralized Policymaking 
We start by investigating the environmental policy set in the centralized system of 
environmental policy making. In this case, the return to (the fixed amount of) capital is simply 
given by fk , and changes in environmental policies induce no capital flows between jurisdictions. 
We assume that the workers, environmentalists, and capital owners in the economy (i.e., 
in both jurisdictions) all overcome free-rider problems and form their own separate lobby groups 
that encompass all individuals in both jurisdictions One and Two. In the first stage of a two-stage 
game, the organized lobbies offer the central government political contribution schedules 
W,E,K i C
i =   ), (α , that relate prospective contributions to the environmental policy chosen by 
the central government (see, e.g., Damania, 2001).  In the second stage, the government sets its 
optimal environmental policy, and collects the corresponding contributions from each lobby.  
The gross welfare functions for the lobby groups are given by 
  () Vf k f
WW
k () αβ ≡−         ( 1 )    
  VY
EE E () αβ θ ≡−           ( 2 )    
  k
K f K V ≡ ) (α            ( 3 )    
The central government is assumed to derive utility from a weighted sum of campaign 




K E W i
i i G C aV V
, ,
) ( ) ( ) ( α α α ,           ( 4 )      6
where  0 ≥ a  is the government’s weighting on social welfare relative to campaign contributions. 
Under the centralized system, the effect of relaxing the pollution standard on the worker lobby, 
capital owner lobby, and environmental lobby, respectively, is given by (where  L β
W = ):  
() ; ) ( α α α β α k
W W kf f V − =            ( 5 )    
; ) (
E W E V β β α α − =           ( 6 )    
. ) ( α α β α k
W K kf V =             ( 7 )    
Expression (5) shows that workers’ wage income rises with a more lax environmental 
standard in proportion to the rise in total output, minus the capital owners’ share of this increase; 
(7) suggests the latter group benefits from a rise in the marginal productivity of capital. The 
environmentalists are firmly against a weaker standard, see (6). 
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the widely known model by Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) may be shown to equal the maximization of a weighted sum of the lobby 
groups’ objective functions, where the first-order condition (assuming an interior solution) 
equals 





K E W i
i V a .           ( 8 )    
Equation (8) represents the equilibrium characterization of the emissions-labor ratio. 
Substituting expressions (5)-(7) into (8) and canceling terms reveals that under a centralized 
institutional arrangement, the environmental policy is set such that 
.
E f β α =            ( 9 )    
Thus, in equilibrium the marginal product of pollution, given by  , α f  equals its marginal 
social damage, given by  .
E β  Next, we turn to the decentralized system. 
Decentralized Policymaking   7
 Under the decentralized system of environmental policymaking, the two jurisdictions are 
induced to compete for the available mobile capital stock. We now assume that the workers, 
environmentalists, and capital owners form separate lobby groups in each of the two 
jurisdictions.  In the first stage, these lobby groups simultaneously and non-cooperatively offer 
their respective local governments contributions schedules relating the size of the political 
transfer to the policy selected, taking as given all other lobbies’ schedules. In the second stage, 
the two local governments set their favored policies and collect the corresponding contributions. 
The marginal productivity of the jurisdiction One’s capital stock,  , k f  must in equilibrium 
be equal to the marginal productivity of jurisdiction Two’s capital stock,  .
*
k f  Since the overall 
stock of capital,  , K  is fixed, an increase in jurisdiction One’s capital stock (due to a more lax 
environmental policy, for example) necessarily results in a decrease in jurisdiction Two’s capital 
stock. Using  ), , ( ) , (












* − = dk dk  Thus, under a decentralized regime, there are additional incentives for workers 
and capital owners to lobby for more lax environmental standards relative to the centralized 
system. However, the environmental lobby’s marginal lobbying incentive remains constant. In 
particular, the effect of a more lax environmental standard on the worker, environmental, and 
capital owner lobby groups’ utility functions are now given by, respectively, 
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E W E V β β α α − =           ( 1 1 )      8






























α α β α          ( 1 2 )    
We now seek to compare these effects with the corresponding results for the centralized 
setting (see Eqns. (5)-(7)). The (additional) positive term A in expression (8) suggests that the 
worker lobby has an additional incentive to lobby for lax regulation due to the potential inflow of 
capital (and thus higher productivity of labor). The negative term B in expression (12) is the 
capital owner’s corresponding disincentive to receive more capital in the jurisdiction, as this 
lowers the productivity of the existing capital stock. The positive term C represents the capital 
owners’ additional incentive to lobby for weaker regulation due to the fact that the newly arrived 
capital becomes relatively more productive.  
Finally, note that in the case of symmetry (two identical jurisdictions), in equilibrium no 
capital flows occur (capital would only flow in the presence of some form of asymmetry in 
lobbying efforts). The worker and capital owner lobby groups nevertheless have an incentive 
engage in lobbying, as their interests otherwise would suffer.  
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the decentralized case corresponds to the 
equilibrium of the (large-country) non-cooperative game of Grossman and Helpman (1995). This 
implies that the equilibrium response of jurisdiction One to Two’s equilibrium emissions 
standard,  ,
* α  again equals the maximization of a weighted sum of the lobby groups’ objective 
functions. Thus, the equilibrium policy set in jurisdiction One satisfies 
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which is its policy response to an arbitrary policy set by jurisdiction Two. Substituting 
expressions (10)-(12) into (13) and canceling terms reveals that under a centralized institutional 
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In equilibrium, the environmental policy is set such that the marginal productivity of 




A comparison of expressions (9) and (14) yields the following prediction. In our 
empirical work below, we seek to test the validity of this prediction. 
 
Prediction 1: In equilibrium, environmental policy is stricter under centralized environmental 
policymaking.  
 
Proof: The left-hand side of (14) contains a positive term (term A), not included in (9). With an 
equal capital stock,  , K  under centralized and decentralized institutional designs, and 
E β  
constant, the marginal productivity of emissions,  , α f  must be greater under centralized 
environmental policymaking. Thus, the stringency of environmental policy is greater under 
centralized environmental policymaking. Q.E.D.  
III. EMPIRICAL WORK 
Empirical Specification and Data    10
The theoretical model developed in the previous section yields a testable implication of 
the relationship between federalism and environmental policy formation, expressed in 
Proposition 1. The first hypothesis to be tested is: countries practicing federalism (decentralized 
policy making) set less strict environmental policies than do non-federal countries.  
Moreover, our simple model assumes free trade. We study the importance of this 
assumption by testing whether the effect of federalism is conditional on the degree of openness 
to trade. If the determination of environmental policies is (already) affected by greater trade 
openness, the impact of federalism (and thus greater capital competition) may be hypothesized to 
differ. In countries already heavily exposed to foreign competition in trade, federalism may have 
a smaller marginal effect on environmental policymaking, for example. The second hypothesis to 
be tested is therefore as follows: is the effect of federalism (decentralized policy making) 
conditional on the degree of openness to international trade?  
Our objective is to test these hypotheses using cross-country data on environmental 





γλγiλ i+ εi,        (15)  
where αi is the stringency of environmental policy in country i, xi is a vector of controls, γi is an 
indicator of decentralized (federation) or centralized government organization, λi is a measure of 
trade openness, and εi is a zero mean error term. β
γ, β
λ, and β
γλ are coefficient scalars, and β
x is a 
coefficient vector.   
We now describe the variables and data used to test our hypotheses. Our measure of the 
stringency of environmental regulations is from the 2004 Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment Index developed by the World Bank (2004).  This index is one of the main criteria 
used by the World Bank to allocate International Development Assistance resources between   11
low-income developing countries. It serves as an assessment tool for the World Bank to gauge 
the likely return to development assistance in specific countries. The index relies on the 
judgment of technical analysts to assess how well a country’s policy and institutional framework 
fosters economic development, seeking to measure policies aimed at poverty reduction, 
sustainable growth and the effective use of development assistance.  The emphasis is on policy 
actions and institutional effectiveness (i.e., laws on the book, implementation, monitoring, and 
enforcement), rather than outcomes.8 One of the 20 separate measures is “Policies and 
Institutions for Environmental Sustainability,” which we denote Environmental Capacity.  This 
comprehensive measure assesses the extent to which economic and environmental policies foster 
(i) the protection and sustainable use of natural resources, and (ii) pollution management.9  
Moreover, the aggregate measure contains separate sub-measures for air pollution, waste 
management, water management, coastal and marine management, biodiversity management, 
and commercial natural resource management. In our empirical work, we make use of both the 
aggregate index (Environmental Capacity), and five of the separate sub-indices (we ignore the 
coastal and marine management index as it is tangential to our focus). This is one of the most 
comprehensive data sets available measuring the environmental policy framework and 
institutional capacity across 90 developing countries, and has the advantage of providing sector-
level data.  
To classify centralized versus decentralized structure of government we use a dummy 
variable as an indicator of the federal structure of government (Federalism), which comes from 
                                                 
8 While this index is not yet public, the World Bank intends to publish the index relating to IDA countries starting 
2006. 
9 Although specific criteria are used for the ratings carried out by experts, they remain somewhat subjective. We 
note however that the ratings are scrutinized carefully by World Bank staff with extensive in-country and sector 
knowledge.    12
Forum of Federations (2005)  (see also Fisman and Gatti, 2002).  It takes a value of 1 if 
federation and 0 otherwise. Out of the 90 countries in our data set, 13 are federations. In for 
example India, Nigeria and Mexico, decentralization is based on the political and/or legal 
structures (the constitution, specific laws, or government bills). The states or provinces form a 
federation, and each such jurisdiction has its own elected government with a wide range of fiscal 
powers and environmental enforcement responsibilities. In contrast, countries such as Bolivia, 
Ghana, and Viet Nam are unitary states, where environmental enforcement is regulated through 
decrees or directives from the central government (World Bank, 1999). We treat all non-
federations as having centralized systems of environmental policy making.  
We also utilize an alternative measure of the degree of decentralization. The number of 
government tiers, and the number of jurisdictions within each tier, has implications for the 
degree of decentralization. IMF (2002) provides information on the number of tiers, and 
jurisdictions within each tier.  We use the number of major sub-national entities (Subnational) 
within a country (such as states or provinces) as a second measure of the structure of the 
government. 
We also seek to control for demand factors and structural features of an economy that may 
influence environmental policy in alternative ways that are not the focus of the present paper. 
First, many studies have found a relationship between income and environmental quality (see, 
e.g., Hettige et al., 2000). We thus include the purchasing power adjusted per capita GDP as a 
control (GDP). Second, the greater the number of individuals located in urban centers, the 
greater is the aggregate exposure to pollution and thus the marginal disutility of pollution. We 
use percent of the population in urban areas (%Urban) to measure this exposure.10   
                                                 
10 No direct measure of marginal pollution damage is included since this is determined by environmental policies.    13
Fredriksson and Svensson (2003), e.g., identify the degree of government honesty (lack of 
corruption) as a determinant of environmental policy outcomes in the agricultural sector.   
Honesty is the corruption perceptions index developed by Transparency International (2005), 
which measures the “perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk 
analysts, and the general public.”  The index is computed as the sample average of a number of 
different surveys assessing each country’s performance. Honesty ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) 
to 10 (perfectly clean). We expect a negative sign. 
Trade openness is often viewed as an important determinant of environmental policy and 
quality (see, e.g., Antweiler et al., 2001), although the direction of the effect is disputed.  Our 
Openness index measures the fraction of imports and exports summed, relative to GDP.  
Finally, Pargal and Mani (2001) and Fredriksson et al. (2005) study the influence of citizen 
activism and environmental lobbying on environmental policy outcomes, and Pargal and 
Wheeler (1996) suggest that greater community and civic involvement could complement formal 
regulation in strengthening environmental compliance. We use the number of environmental 
NGOs (ENGOs) from Europa Publications (2001) to control for environmental lobbying. 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables used. The data appendix 




IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We investigate empirically the implications of our model for a sample of 90 countries for 
which the Environmental Capacity variable and its sub-components (air pollution, waste   14
management, water management, biodiversity management, and commercial natural resource 
management) are available.  The OLS estimation results are presented in Tables 2-4.  We begin 
by discussing the robustness of these results, using several different specification tests. 
First, we test for the possible presence of  endogeneity of the Honesty and Openness 
variables, which may bias our OLS results. We use an augmented regression test (DWH test), 
suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). This is carried out by including the residuals of 
each endogenous right-hand side variable as a function of all exogenous variables in a regression 
of the original model.  If they are significant, endogeneity cannot be rejected.11  As reported in 
Tables 2-4, we can not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of Honesty and Openness.  This 
suggests that our OLS results are indeed adequate for gauging the relative influences of Honesty 
and Openness on Environmental Capacity. 
Second, we tested for heteroskedasticity using a Cook-Weisberg test (Cook and Weisberg, 
1983). This is a chi-squared test of the null hypothesis that the variance is not a function of the 
fitted values. The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity could not be rejected at the 5% level for 
any of the specifications.  
Third, in order to test for possible neglected nonlinearities, we conducted a version of the 
Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables. The version employed uses an F-test to test the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients on the 2nd to 4th powers of the explanatory variables in an 
augmented model are equal to zero (Wooldridge, 2002). The Ramsey Reset test indicated that a 
non-linear term(s) may be missing in some models. In order to deal with this issue, we included 
GDP
2 in the relevant models (that did not pass the test).  Subsequently, all specifications pass the 
                                                 
11 The tests are performed using a set of standard instrumental variables for Honesty s u c h  a s  r u l e  o f  l a w ,  
accountability and common law system (see La Porta et al., 1999; Persson et al., 1997; Persson and Tabellini, 1999)   15
Ramsey Reset test, except the Ecosystem Management Models in Tables 3 and 4 and the Natural 
Resource Management Model in Table 3. We therefore added GDP
3 and Honesty
2 in the 
Ecosystem Management and Natural Resource Management models. The fit then improved and 
they pass the Ramsey Reset test. This suggests that all three variables have a declining impact on 
Ecosystems and Natural Resources Management. However, as discussed below, multicollinearity 
issues arise.  Although we report the models containing GDP
2 and
 GDP
3 for completeness, the 
reader needs to be aware that these particular non-linear specifications suffer from 
multicollinearity (see the VIF scores discussed below).  
Fourth, we tested for the presence of  multicollinearity between various independent 
variables using the variance inflation factor (VIF) method.12  As reported in Tables 2-4, the mean 
VIF scores range between 1.74 and 5.55 (higher in models with GDP
2) for all models not 
including GDP
3 and Honesty
2. Hence, we may rule out multicollinearity as a problem in all but 
the latter models.  These latter models, which do pass the Ramsey Reset test, obviously display a 
high degree of multicollinerarity (VIF scores above 80).  Overall, we are satisfied with the 
robustness displayed by the key variables of interest in our models. 
Table 2 reports the results for our Environmental Capacity models.  Model 1 shows 
support for the hypothesis that Federalism has a negative effect on overall environmental policy 
stringency. Subnational in Model 3 mimics this finding, suggesting that greater subnational 
autonomy leads to less stringent environmental policies.  
                                                                                                                                                             
and  Openness, such as democracy, political freedom, economic freedom (see Fredriksson and Mani, 2004; 
Damania et al. 2004).  
12 The VIF score is given by 1/(1-R
2 auxiliary) where R
2 auxiliary is the R
2 from regressing one independent 
variable on all other independent variables. The VIF score shows how the variance of an estimator is inflated by the 
presence of multicollinearity. The VIF ranges from 1.0 to infinity. VIF scores greater than 10.0 are generally seen as 
indicative of severe multicollinearity.    16
Models 2 and 4 explore whether the effect of Federalism is conditional on the degree of 
exposure to international goods markets by including the relevant interactions. Both 
Federalism*Openness and Subnational*Openness are positive and significant, while 
Federalism and Subnational remain negative and significant.  Thus, our results suggest that the 
effect of Federalism  is reduced in countries that are relatively open to international trade 
(although the Ramsey Reset test appears to cast some doubt on Model 2). This is consistent with 
a view that relatively open countries are already competing more intensively with their trade 
partners (using environmental policies), and thus the marginal incentive for local jurisdictions to 
compete (nationally) is relatively lower in more open federations. Alternatively, if more open 
countries attract more foreign direct investment, the degree of competition for scarce capital may 
decline on the margin. The effect of Federalism and Subnational remains negative at the mean 
of Openness, however, although economically it is relatively small. For example, using Model 2 
in Table 2 the marginal effect equals ∂Environmental Capacity/∂Federalism  = -0.92 + 
0.0102x63.51 = -0.27. Using Model 4, the marginal effect equals ∂Environmental 
Capacity/∂Subnational = -0.023 + 0.0003x63.51 = -0.004. 
Openness is negative and significant in all models. However, note that the positive and 
significant coefficient on Federalism*Openness in Model 2 suggest that in federal systems 
(Federalism = 1), greater openness to trade raises Environmental Capacity (∂Environmental 
Capacity/∂Openness = -0.0099 + 0.0102x1 = 0.0003), albeit by an economically insignificant 
amount. Again from Model 2, in centralized systems (Federalism = 0), the marginal effect of 
Openness equals -0.0099, but this is again economically insignificant. In any case, this is further 
evidence that the effect of trade liberalization is country specific (see, e.g., Antweiler et al.,   17
2001), and in this case the effect is conditional on the presence of the institution of federalism (a 
point not previously made in the literature, to our knowledge). 
Turning to the remaining variables, we find that ENGOs is positive and significant. This 
suggests that environmental lobbying plays an important role for environmental policy outcomes 
in developing countries. This lends further support to the activities of international organizations 
such as the World Bank that nurture environmental NGOs in developing countries.
13 On the other 
hand, we find that GDP is consistently positive, as one would expect from the literature (albeit 
the coefficient being small). We find a similar weak significance level for %Urban. The 
negative sign may potentially reflect the political power of urban workers, who may favor less 
stringent environmental policies. Finally, Honesty is insignificant in Models 2 and 4, i.e. where 
the interaction terms are not included.  
Specific Pollutants 
We now extend our analysis by studying whether the effect of environmental federalism 
differs among individual pollutants. As discussed above, we have unique and detailed 
information (as part of the aggregate Environmental Capacity index used in the previous 
section) on the stringency of environmental policies used to address air pollution and water 
pollution, as well as the level of waste management, ecosystem management, and the 
management of commercial natural resources (forestry, fisheries and minerals).  The basic direct 
results of Federalism are reported in Table 3, and in Table 4 the interaction 
Federalism*Openness is added.  We note that the Air Pollution and Ecosystem Management 
                                                 
13
 The Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund is a joint initiative of Conservation International, the Global 
Environment Facility, the Government of Japan, the MacArthur Foundation, and the World Bank. The Fund aims to 
create working alliances among diverse groups, to combine capacities and eliminating duplication of efforts for a 
comprehensive and coordinated approach to conservation challenges, to encourage local dialogue with extractive 
industries, to strengthen indigenous organizations, and facilitating partnerships. For further details, see 
www.cepf.net/xp/cepf/about_cepf/index.xml (visited September 15, 2005).   18
sub-components of Environmental Capacity appear to drive a large share of the results reported 
in Table 2 (these models contain mostly significant coefficients, consistent with our Table 2 
results). However, the Ecosystem Management (1) model does not pass the Ramsey Reset test, 
and thus we view our Air Pollution results as more reliable. Air pollution is perhaps among the 
first environmental problems to be easily observed by the general citizens in developing 
countries, and therefore among the first to be addressed. Thus, one may expect that both 
economic policies (such as environmental federalism) and special interests (such as 
environmental lobbying) may have a particular pronounced effect on this type of pollutants in 
lower income countries.  We also note that the models in Tables 3 and 4 explain a smaller 
fraction of the variation in the dependent variables than in Table 2, perhaps due to the 
disaggregated levels of the independent variables used in Tables 3 and 4. 
For the air pollution index, the results in Table 3 closely mirror the Environmental 
Capacity results index in Table 2, in particular regarding the effect of Federalism. In this area, 
centralized regimes appear to result in significantly more stringent environmental policy 
outcomes. Water and wastes are frequently managed in a highly decentralized manner (mostly 
by municipalities), and this may explain why Federalism is insignificant in these particular 
models.  
In Table 4, Federalism has a significant effect on the stringency of air pollution regulation 
and ecosystem management, although the effect is negative in all models. Moreover, the effect of 
Federalism on these policies declines, the greater is Openness.  
Turning to the control variables in Tables 3 and 4, we find that GDP growth has a 
significant positive effect on all forms of environmental regulations except Ecosystem 
Management. On the other hand, Honesty has a consistently positive effect only on Ecosystems   19
Management and Natural Resource Management (in Table 4, Honesty also strengthens Waste 
Pollution regulation). This may explain the insignificance of some of the Honesty results in 
Table 2. Environmental lobbying, as captured by ENGOs, affects environmental policies 
addressing Air Pollution, Waste Pollution, and Ecosystem Management in a positive and 
strongly significant fashion (consistent with the Table 2 results). %Urban is (negative) 
significant only for Waste Pollution regulation in Table 3.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
As developing countries undergo or consider some form of decentralization of government 
responsibilities, concerns arise regarding the environmental impacts of decentralized policy 
making. However, empirical research underpinning the associated difficult policy decisions in 
developing countries is severely lacking in this policy area.  
This paper seeks to evaluate the empirical effects of environmental federalism across 
developing countries. We develop a simple theory of environmental policy formation in 
centralized and decentralized systems, where worker-, capital- and environmental lobby groups 
compete for the favors of a semi-benevolent government. The prediction that emerges is that a 
decentralized government regime yields weaker environmental policy than a centralized 
institutional design. This is due to a greater aggregate incentive for worker- and capital-owner 
lobbying for less stringent environmental policy under a decentralized system. Using a novel and 
unique World Bank dataset, we find empirical support for this prediction. This holds especially 
for air pollution policies. Moreover, we also find that the effect of federalism is conditional on 
the degree of trade openness. In particular, the negative effect of environmental federalism falls 
as the degree of trade openness rises. We believe this is the first cross-country evidence of a 
negative effect of federal institutional designs in developing countries.   20
We should note that our empirical results do not imply that centralized environmental 
policymaking is necessarily optimal for all countries, only that centralized countries on average 
set stricter environmental policy. Strong heterogeneity between a country’s jurisdictions may 
still tilt the balance towards decentralization, for example. 
Our findings do suggest that during efforts to decentralize government structures in 
developing countries (perhaps in order to improve service delivery in other policy areas such as 
health and education), environmental policymakers as well as environmental NGOs need to pay 
attention need to the possible detrimental effects due to excessive capital competition among 
lower level jurisdictions. This calls for strengthening local environmental management capacity 
along with broader decentralization reform programs including administrative and institutional 
mechanisms to handle environmental matters.  Our findings also suggest that, a simultaneous 
trade liberalization program may reduce the negative long-term impacts on environmental 
policies of federalism.    21
 Data Appendix 
Variable   Source 
Environmental Capacity  World Bank (2004) 
Federalism   Forum of Federations (2005) 
%Urban  World Development Indicators (2004) 
GDP    World Development Indicators (2004) 
Openness   International Trade Center, World Development Indicators (2004) 
Honesty  Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (2004) 
ENGOs  Europa Publications (2001). 
Subnational   IMF Government Financial Statistics (2002) 
Air Pollution Management  World Bank (2004) 
Water Pollution Management  World Bank (2004) 
Waste Management  World Bank (2004) 
Ecosystem Management  World Bank (2004) 
Natural Resources Management  World Bank (2004) 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable   Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Environmental Capacity  86  3.59 0.82 2.21 5.70 
Federalism   86  0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
%Urban  86  48.97 18.12 14.91 90.33 
GDP    83  4434.75 3079.67  496.26 12447.25 
Openness   85 64.09  33.51  14.19  182.37 
Honesty  74  3.11 1.20 1.50 9.10 
ENGOs  82 11.99  13.60  0.00  65.00 
Subnational   86 20.94  17.17  3.00  89.00 
Air Pollution Management  78  3.21  1.22  1.00  6.00 
Water Pollution Management  84  3.60  0.92  1.28  5.40 
Waste  Management  82  3.60 1.15 1.28 6.00 
Ecosystem  Management  84  3.68 1.03 2.04 5.79 
Natural Resources Management  85  3.60  0.94  1.83  6.00 
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Table 2: Environmental Capacity Regressions 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 





























































    0.0003 
(1.9)* 








No. of Obs.  71  71  71  71 
R
2  0.508 0.612 0.502 0.525 
DWH Test 
Honesty 
F(1,58) = 0.24 
p value = 0.6257 
F(1,57) = 0.25 
p value = 0.6182 
F(1,58) = 0.10 
p value = 0.7494 
F(1,57) = 0.06 
p value = 0.8037 
DWH Test 
Openness 
F(1,58) = 0.77 
p value = 0.3831 
F(1,57) = 0.80 
p value = 0.3737 
F(1,58) = 0.57 
p value = 0.4539 
F(1,57) = 0.01 
p value = 0.9307 
Ramsey 
Reset Test 
F(3,63) = 1.47 
p value = 0.2320 
F(3,59) = 1.91 
p value = 0.1386 
F(3,63) = 0.56 
p value = 0.6403 
F(3,62) = 1.18 
p value = 0.3236 
Mean  VIF  1.76 5.39 1.81 3.89 
Notes: The dependent variable is Environmental Capacity. t-statistics in parenthesis.  
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No.  of  Obs.    68 69 67 70 70 70 70 
R

















p value = 
.2634 
F(1,57) =    
1.46 


























p value = 
.2217 
F(1,57) =    
0.48 




p value = 
.3742 
F(1,58) =    
1.02 






























p value = 
.3896 
Mean  VIF  1.76 1.75 1.83 5.33  85.05  5.43  86.85 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. *** (**) [*] Statistically significant at 1 (5) [10] percent level.   28
































































































2       -.001 
(0.03) 
 






































No. of Obs.  68  69  67  70  70  70 
R
2 0.471  0.399  0.408  0.517  0.520  0.474 
DWH Test 
Honesty 
F(1,54) =  
.37 












p value = 
.2493 
F(1,56) =    
 0.73 








F(1,54) =  
.18 












p value = 
.2009 
F(1,56) =    
2.24 








F(3,59) =  
.30 




















p value = 
.1062 
Mean VIF  2.35  5.55  2.42  5.41  80.67  5.52 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. *** (**) [*] Statistically significant at 1 (5) [10] percent level. 
 
 
 